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 1 
Strategies of Navigation: Migrants’ Everyday Encounters with Italian Immigration 
Bureaucracy 
 
Abstract 
Successful encounters with bureaucratic systems require users to be familiar with ‘insider’ 
rules, attitudes and behaviour. This article examines migrants’ everyday efforts to become and 
stay ‘legal’ in Italy, and shows how they need to develop particular strategies in order to do 
so. While these strategies help migrants in the short term, I argue that ultimately they enable 
the Italian state to reconcile its conflicting interests and reproduce migrants’ marginal and 
insecure status in Italian society. Examining everyday mundane interactions with the state and 
its bureaucracy reveals the various ways in which state practices produce insecurity.  
 
Key words: bureaucracy, documents, illegality, Italy, migration, the state.  
 
Being a migrant in Italy involves a close and long term-relationship with what I call the 
Italian documentation regime. Experiences with the bureaucracy of Italian immigration law 
are characterized by long waiting times, mix-ups of information, the issuing of expired 
permits, endless queues, chasing up ‘blocked’ applications and documents being lost. Italy’s 
migrants are a heterogeneous group, significantly varying in their language abilities, the 
period of time they have spent in Italy and their country of origin. Yet, despite these 
differences, encounters with the immigration bureaucracy, which are frequent and enduring, 
are experiences shared by all. The difficulty in attaining citizenship, or even long-term 
permits, means that most migrants face permit renewal every two years.
1
 For those lucky 
enough to have secure legal status, encounters with the regime continue through family and 
friends. Thus, dealing with the documentation regime is a defining feature of what it means to 
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be a migrant in Italy and was experienced by my informants as all pervasive and intrusive. 
This article explores how, through long and enduring encounters with the exclusionary 
immigration bureaucracy, migrants adopt strategies in order to successfully navigate it. These 
strategies necessitate the development of particular attitudes and behaviours which were 
identified by migrants and their advisers as pertaining to ‘il sistema paese’ [system of the 
country].  
 
The anthropological record has shown that bureaucracies function in a manner that is a far cry 
from the ideal type described by Weber. Instead, bureaucracies and bureaucratic encounters 
are affective. They produce and are produced by emotion, self-interest, social networks and 
much more (Gupta 1995; Heyman 1995; Olivier De Sardan 1999; Nuijten 2003). Moreover, 
rather than engendering transparency and consistency, bureaucracies, and the paperwork 
which accompanies this form of governance, create uncertainty and indeterminacy for low-
level bureaucrats and users alike (Cabot 2012; Kelly 2006; Navaro-Yashin 2007; 
Triandafyllidou 2003). Given the ambiguous nature of bureaucratic processes, knowing one’s 
way around bureaucracies and playing by the ‘pragmatic’ rules (Bailey 1969) is essential in 
any context in order to successfully manage bureaucratic encounters (Gupta 1995). In the 
Italian setting, studies have shown that when dealing with bureaucracy, individuals must 
carefully manage the gap between the ‘real’ rules – those which exist in practice – and the 
‘official’ rules (Galt 1974; Shore 1989; Zinn 2001) – those that exist on paper. Whether 
dealing with the tax office or a university administration, overly adhering to the official rules 
can lead to losing out (Guano 2010: 475), while excessively flouting them risks losing 
reputation and much more (Shore 1989; Zinn 2001). Treading the fine line between the 
‘official’ and the ‘real’ rules, however, requires insider knowledge and finesse. Indeed, many 
anthropological accounts of bureaucratic encounters feature inexperienced actors whose 
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blunders highlight the insider knowledge necessary to navigate bureaucratic labyrinths (Gupta 
1995; Nuijten 2003; Shore 1989). It is precisely through these actors’ errors that the gap 
between the ‘official’ and the ‘real’ is exposed.  
 
Building on this work, this article focuses on migrants’ encounters with immigration 
bureaucracy in their efforts for themselves and their families to become and stay ‘legal’. I 
show how while the ambiguity and uncertainty that characterize the bureaucracy is frustrating 
and anxiety inducing, it also allows for flexibility. Through engagement with the arbitrary and 
uncertain ‘terrain’ (Vigh 2006, 2009) of immigration bureaucracy, migrants learn to develop 
strategies to manipulate the law’s loopholes and help them have applications accepted: they 
learn the ‘real’ rules. Consequently, and paradoxically, therefore, through their practice of 
Italy’s exclusionary and uncertain documentation regime, over time migrants become cultural 
insiders.  
 
Studies on law and migration have focused on the way in which migrants must grapple with 
ambiguous and arbitrary laws that shift across space and time. These studies have tended to 
focus on the imposing and restrictive nature of law and the way in which it produces migrants 
as vulnerable and deportable subjects (Calavita 2005; De Genova 2002; Heyman 1995). In 
contrast, in the case studies that follow migrants are depicted as resourceful and able to 
manipulate laws. This representation, however, should not be seen in contradiction with those 
of earlier studies. By analysing migrants’ micro-strategies of navigation as well as the broader 
context within which they take place, I aim to contribute to the overarching insights made by 
those studies that show how immigration laws – and the ambiguities within them – function to 
produce migrants as an insecure labour force. To do this, I examine how these ‘informal’ 
practices are situated within the state’s production of insecurity and ambiguity. Building on 
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Heyman and Smart (1999), Elyacher (2005) has advocated that informal practices are 
themselves part of statecraft and must not be considered as taking place outside of the state 
(2005: 69). That is, the ‘real’ and the ‘official’ must be considered as constituent of one 
system. This means bringing the contradictions, indeterminacies and ambiguities that state 
practices produce to centre stage (see Kelly 2006; Ochs 2011). Work on law and migration 
has provided evidence for such an approach by showing that ‘illegality’ itself is created by 
immigration laws (Calavita 2005; De Genova 2002). Building on these observations, this 
article will examine how migrants’ strategies to navigate and manipulate the regime are not in 
contradiction with official state practices but instead are products of them. Given the 
multifarious nature of the state (Sharma & Gupta 2006; Hansen & Stepputat 2001), the 
contradictions and indeterminacies by which it is inevitably characterized must somehow 
appear to be reconciled in order to produce a coherent ‘state effect’ (Abrams 1988; Mitchell 
2006). As I will suggest, migrants’ strategies help to produce this coherency, as they act as a 
bridge to close the gap between ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ practices, and enable the state to 
smooth out its contradictory interests.  
 
  
Fieldwork 
 
Following migrants’ relationships with Italian bureaucracy as they sought to become and stay 
‘legal’, I conducted nineteen months fieldwork from October 2009 to May 2011 in a North-
Eastern Italian city.
2
 My fieldwork was principally based in an advice centre for migrants, 
which was run by a trade union. The centre’s role was two-fold. Firstly, it completed 
applications for permit renewal, family re-unification and citizenship, as well as various other 
related bureaucratic procedures. Secondly, it acted as a first port of call for migrants needing 
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support, information and advice. A large proportion of the centre’s work was to mediate 
between migrants and the Questura, which is the police station and immigration office.
3
 There 
was no information centre at the Questura and it was almost impossible for migrants to check 
the status of their applications independently. As will be discussed, the centre acted as a 
mediator that accessed information about delayed applications and helped migrants to 
challenge unfair decisions made by the Questura. The services which the centre offered were 
free of charge, but migrants were encouraged to enlist as trade union members. 
 
I acted as a volunteer in the centre. This involved learning the ins and outs of Italian 
immigration law and later providing advice on the welcome counter, as well as taking 
appointments and checking permit status on the computer. Conversation and interviews were 
usually conducted in Italian. On some occasions, I also acted as an interpreter for those who 
came from Anglophone countries or for those who spoke English but not Italian. 
 
 
Exclusionary Law 
 
The Italian documentation regime is currently guided by the Bossi-Fini law. Created in 2002 
under Silvio Berlusconi’s coalition government by Gianfranco Fini, a rightwing politician, 
and Umberto Bossi, the leader of the infamously xenophobic Northern League (Lega Nord), 
the law has been criticized as discriminatory and driven by anti-immigrant politics. Under the 
law, a migrant’s legal status is contingent upon presenting a regular work contract. 
Consequently, regardless of how many years one has lived in the country, losing one’s job or 
being employed unofficially in the ‘black market’ can result in the loss of legal status. In 2009 
the so-called ‘Security Packet’ furthered this apparently tough stance on immigration. The bill 
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included a dramatic rise in the cost of permit renewal and it made the status of ‘illegality’ a 
crime.   
 
However, alongside the government’s tough rhetorical stance on immigration and its 
exclusionary law, there exist frequent programmes for legalization and entry quota systems 
for new foreign workers to enter the country legally (Schuster 2005: 761). Indeed, during my 
nineteen-month fieldwork period there was an amnesty for domestic workers which legalized 
approximately 270,000 people and a decreto flussi, which allowed for the legal entry of over 
98,000 people through work contracts with employers based in Italy. There were also several 
seasonal decreto flussi, which allowed for the entry of temporary migrants employed on 
short-term work contracts. The apparent mismatch between an exclusionary rhetoric and 
regular programmes of legalizations and entry, have been explained in a number of ways. 
Zincone (2011) has discussed the influence of the so-called ‘advocacy coalition’, which 
includes Catholic organisations, industries desiring foreign labour, left-wing NGOs, trade 
unions and Italian families who employ migrant domestic workers. The employment of 
domestic workers, usually badanti – who are live-in carers for the elderly – is very common 
in Italy.
4
 The country’s ageing population and limited state provisions for care of the elderly 
have created a high demand for such labour. Migrant workers, who are usually women, 
dominate this sector. Zincone notes that the pressure from such advocacy groups has led to 
immigration policy being on a ‘zigzagging path’ (2011: 278) in which immigration law is 
harsh and exclusionary yet also allows for large-scale and fairly frequent legalization 
programmes.  
 
Scholarly work on immigration law, often based in the United States, has argued that such 
contradictions and uncertainties are a product of conflicting interests at the heart of state 
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policy. Governments seek to maintain a tough stance on immigration in order to appease 
public opinion and secure votes, while simultaneously enjoying the economic benefits of a 
vulnerable and low-paid foreign work force (Coutin 2000; Heyman 1995; Portes 1978). De 
Genova argues that the ambiguities and inconsistencies of laws must be considered as a 
tactical ‘apparatus for sustaining … [migrants’] vulnerability and tractability as workers’ 
(2002: 439). In a similar vein, with reference to Italy, Calavita has argued that Italy’s 
temporary and contingent permit system results in ‘institutionalized irregularity’ (2005: 43) 
which is inseparable from migrants’ labour function. She suggests that through their 
precarious and temporary legal statuses, migrants remain perpetually ‘Other’. She argues that 
this is a ‘critical ingredient of their flexibility’ and ensures that they remain in low-level, 
poorly paid and insecure jobs – the so called ‘non-EU’ jobs (those that native European 
citizens refuse to do) (Calavita 2005: 265).  
 
Such arguments are well-supported by the material facts of migrants’ conditions in Italy. A 
report by Catholic migrant advocacy group Caritas shows that, despite contributing ten 
percent to Italy’s GDP in 2010, foreign workers’ salaries were markedly lower than native 
Italians’, earning on average 32.8 percent less.5 Additionally, Zincone argues that although 
campaigns to improve the basic rights and legal status of migrants do exist, the ‘commitment 
to political and citizenship rights for long term residents is less tenacious’ (2006: 13). Thus, 
such advocacy on behalf of migrants’ rights is paternalistic in nature and does not challenge 
the unequal inclusion which migrants encounter.  
 
 
Bureaucratic Encounters 
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Long waiting times marked migrants’ experiences of the Italian documentation regime and 
were often the prime reason for anxiety. These waits included queuing at the Questura to 
provide fingerprints for permit renewal or collection, waiting months for a renewed permit to 
be issued, or waiting years to hear about citizenship applications or family reunification 
requests. Other sources of anxiety included the issuing of already expired permits, permit 
renewal paperwork being suspended without notification to the applicant and the Questura’s 
denial of having received submitted applications. Migrants often understood and rationalized 
the long waiting times as being caused by mistakes they must have made in the completion of 
applications. During my fieldwork period applicants could wait six months or longer for the 
issue of a two year permit. The Questura often failed to inform people when the reason for 
this delay was that documents were missing, causing applications to be ‘blocked’ for months 
on end. The anxiety caused by the long waiting times was exacerbated by false hopes and 
assurances. When providing their fingerprints at the beginning of the renewal phase, migrants 
were told by police officers that their permits would be ready in two months. Even when 
applicants fulfilled all the correct requirements and held the requisite paperwork, their distrust 
of the Questura and its seemingly ever-changing rules made many feel unsure of their status 
until the priceless new permit was actually delivered. 
 
The circulation of misinformation 
As well as the long waiting times and other effects of a seemingly chaotic bureaucracy, 
instability was also caused by the perception that the law was constantly changing and in flux. 
Joy, a Nigerian woman, arrived at the advice centre early on a typically chaotic Monday 
morning.
6
  She had come in the previous week to ask for a list of documents so she could 
apply for a long-term permit as the mother of an Italian citizen. Applications for permits as 
the family member of an Italian citizen entailed a specific set of bureaucratic requirements, 
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with applicants being obliged to submit the paperwork in person at the Questura rather than 
via the postal system. Accordingly, Joy had woken up early, arriving at the Questura at 5am 
to obtain an appointment number in order to be seen when it opened at 8.30am. Since officials 
frequently turned migrants away because of missing paperwork, visits to the Questura often 
needed to be repeated. As with many other applicants, Joy’s Monday morning trip was 
wasted, as the policeman she eventually saw informed her that she was missing documents, 
and she was sent away with a scrap of paper on which the policeman had hand-written:
 
  
- Certificato di idoneità alloggiativa– certificate attesting to the size of accommodation 
and how many people it can accommodate 
- Contratto di locazione registrato – registered rental contract 
- Atto di nascita del figlio – son’s birth certificate 
 
These were three requisites which, according to the usual local Questura practice, Italian 
immigration law and the advice centre’s list of necessary documents, were not in fact required 
for relatives of Italian citizens. But it was common for applicants to be turned away from the 
Questura or to receive letters at home because their applications lacked documents which 
were not officially required. Presuming that the Questura had not understood that she was the 
mother of an Italian citizen, a staff member at the centre told Joy to return to the Questura 
with the birth certificate of her son and to explain again that she was applying for the long-
term permit as the mother of an Italian citizen.  
 
Two days later, and after another unsuccessful 5am start at the Questura, Joy returned, deeply 
frustrated and anxious about the situation. She was also concerned that her work contract 
might be suspended – her permit was due to expire the following week and McDonald’s, 
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where she worked, had a strict policy that workers must have a valid permit, or a receipt for 
permit renewal, at all times (in spite of the fact that the law allows a sixty day period of grace 
to renew permits after their expiry). Alberto, a sympathetic member of staff at the advice 
centre, came out from the back of the office and saw Joy in floods of tears. He ushered her to 
his desk and phoned the Questura to find out if these documents were really required. The 
policeman who answered replied that in ‘some particular cases’ these documents were indeed 
required, but did not give any specific explanation as to why this was so in Joy’s case. Trying 
to find a solution that would allow Joy to procure the receipt for renewal as soon as possible – 
fortunately, Joy did have these extra documents at home – Alberto filled in the usual postal 
application for migrants who have no family connection to an Italian citizen. In doing so, he 
circumvented further face-to-face contact with the police officer, enabling Joy to obtain a 
receipt for renewal as soon as she had sent the application from the post-office.  
 
These kinds of occurrences led to migrants at the advice centre frequently lamenting that ‘the 
law changes from day to day.’ In reality, there is little change in immigration law, but the 
great flexibility and myriad interpretations of the law by different actors means that 
individuals experienced it as fickle and shifting. It was not, however, only the circulation of 
misinformation that gave the impression of the law as malleable. As the next case study 
elucidates, not only were specific laws interpreted and practised differently according to 
locality, but also in some instances the details of particular acts of legislation were undecided. 
 
Changing laws 
In September 2009 the Italian government opened an amnesty for migrant domestic workers 
without permits. This amnesty gave undocumented domestic workers who had been working 
in Italy before April 2009 the opportunity to be regularized in relationship to their employer. 
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In reality, however, the law gave the opportunity to be legalized to anybody who was able to 
find, and usually pay, an ‘employer’. In the months after the amnesty, young Moroccan, 
Pakistani and Tunisian men (cohorts of people who were very unlikely to be hired for 
domestic work) frequently came into the advice centre.
7
 Having secured fake employers, they 
were now checking the status of their applications. If the application was successful, after the 
issuing of the first permit, applicants could then change their ‘job’.  
 
Khan, a thirty year old street-seller from Bangladesh, sold plastic trinkets and roses in the 
city’s main shopping areas. He had lived in Italy for ten years, previously holding a valid 
permit and working in a factory. However, after losing his job and being unable to renew his 
permit he fell into ‘illegality’. Since the expiry of his permit, Khan had been stopped and 
fingerprinted by the police twice; both times being issued with a foglio di via (expulsion) 
ordering him to leave the country within 48 hours. Those issued with expulsions are expected 
to leave the country independently. However, like most others in this position, Khan 
nonetheless remained in Italy. When the amnesty for domestic workers was publicized, Khan 
jumped at the chance of legalization. As Khan was not a domestic worker, in order to submit 
an application for the amnesty he paid an acquaintance to act as his domestic work 
‘employer’. 
 
At the time of the amnesty application period the Ministero del Interno (Home Office) had not 
specified whether those who had previously been issued with expulsions were eligible to 
apply. Accordingly, migration advice centres across the city encouraged everybody to apply 
and ‘see what would happen’, as one staff member described to me. However, when the 
applications of those who had received expulsions became increasingly delayed, rumours 
circulated that those who had been previously stopped and fingerprinted by the police, like 
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Khan, would be refused the issue of a permit. Six months after the submission of applications, 
Khan and several others came into the centre holding copies of the newspaper La Repubblica. 
The paper contained an article that queried whether holding previous expulsions would lead 
to negative responses for amnesty applications. It described how variation in responses would 
depend on the individual questura: ‘ …inflexibility in some provinces and elasticity in 
others… Rigidity in Trieste, Rimini, Perugia. Clemency in Milan, Venice, Bologna and other 
provinces. Consequently, uncertainty everywhere’ (my translation).8 
 
‘So no problems here then?’ Khan asked me. Unsure how to respond, I took the newspaper 
into the back office to show to Alberto. He quickly read the article and replied that those who 
had received only one expulsion should not experience any problems. As I re-entered the 
waiting area Ginetta, another staff member, ran after me. She grabbed my arm and pressed her 
hand to my ear, whispering: ‘Be careful what you tell them, none of us are sure how this is 
going to turn out!’ The newspaper article demonstrated the way in which local areas 
interpreted the amnesty’s rules (or lack of) in different ways, resulting in serious 
consequences for applicants. The issue related to the contradiction between the fact that being 
‘illegal’ in Italy is a criminal offence, yet the amnesty was exclusively for ‘illegal’ migrants 
who had been living in Italy for at least five months.
9
 As in the case of Khan, those who were 
issued with expulsions were not physically deported but were expected to leave the country 
independently. This policy, which layered ‘illegality’ on top of ‘illegality’, resulted in a large 
number of ‘illegal’ migrants remaining on Italian territory with expulsions in hand. While, in 
my fieldsite applications by those who held a number of expulsions were put on hold until the 
Ministero del Interno confirmed whether or not holding expulsions would disallow amnesty 
applicants, other questure behaved differently. In March 2010 a Senegalese citizen was 
summoned to the Questura of Trieste for an appointment regarding his amnesty application. 
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On arrival, the man was arrested and packed off on a plane to Senegal. His crime was that he 
had been previously expelled for his illegal status but had never left the country. Unlike the 
Senegalese man, Khan’s amnesty application was eventually accepted despite his two 
expulsions, proving, as the newspaper article reported, that questura practice varied across 
cities and that the law was being inconsistently applied.  
 
This case demonstrates that migrants’ encounters with contradictory and inconsistent 
information were due not only to the ignorance, incompetence or favouritism of officials or 
staff at advice centres, but also because the official terms and conditions were undecided 
during the application process. This created mistrust and confusion among migrants, and also 
made advice centres very difficult to run and manage, as different individuals were likely to 
provide contradictory information. 
 
The uncertain terrain of immigration bureaucracy 
Writing about how agents act in uncertain and opaque terrains, Vigh advocates the usefulness 
of the concept of social navigation. In his analysis he argues that the term serves as an 
‘analytical optic which allows us to focus on how people move and manage within situations 
of social flux and change’ (2006, 2009). He observes that such action is not a metaphor for 
agency, ‘but rather designates the interface between agency and social forces’ (2006: 14). 
This understanding of action ‘highlights the interactivity of practice’ (2009: 420), thus 
emphasizing the connection between the terrain and the navigation which takes places upon it. 
Applying this concept of social navigation to my ethnographic context allows us to see how 
migrants actively interacted with specific characteristics of Italian immigration law. How 
migrants dealt with and navigated the bureaucracy was channelled by the documentation 
regime’s uncertain nature. Accordingly, migrants’ strategies to ensure that their paperwork 
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was accepted, involved responding in appropriate ways to the misinformation, ambiguities, 
delays and contradictions, which characterized the bureaucracy. Despite their continual 
complaints about unfairness and incompetence, migrants who were successful in their 
encounters learnt not to dwell on the lack of rationale, logic or consistency in the immigration 
bureaucracy. Instead they learnt to accept, if disdainfully, the ad hoc condition to which they 
were subjected and to take advantage of the uncertainty and contradictions within it.  
 
As the next section will outline, by employing an attitude of acceptance in the face of 
unpredictability and chaos, migrants implemented strategies of navigation based on resilience, 
persistence and creative manipulation of rules to turn the system’s indeterminacy to their 
advantage.  
 
 
Working the Gap: Migrants’ Strategies of Manipulation 
 
Migrants’ strategies of navigation were enabled by the way in which their paperwork did not 
always reflect real life circumstances. The documentation regime’s arbitrary and 
indeterminate nature enabled migrants to bend the rules and – as a staff member at the centre 
said – make the ‘impossible, possible’. Although the Questura was strict regarding the 
presentation of the correct documentation for permit issue, these various documents often 
presented a very different ‘life’ to the one that really existed. Accordingly, strategies to have 
paperwork accepted and use the law to one’s advantage included strategic rearranging of the 
facts in application forms.  
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The advice centre played a key role in helping migrants take advantage of the law’s 
flexibility. Sometimes staff members would actively help migrants shape the way they filled 
in the form to become acceptable, while in other cases individuals presented an already 
embellished story which staff members would then have to try to unravel and re-construct. 
Making phone calls to officials and writing cover letters to accompany applications were 
other services provided by the centre. These practices were employed in order to present an 
applicant’s situation that could not be sufficiently conveyed in a tick-box application, or on 
particular occasions to challenge ‘unlawful’ decision-making by the Questura. As such, the 
centre acted as a broker between the migrant and Questura, allowing applicants the 
opportunity to find their way around an otherwise impenetrable bureaucratic maze.  
 
Decreto flussi and amnesties 
Manipulation of the laws’ loopholes was particularly evident when migrants obtained their 
first permit. Distinct from an amnesty, the decreto flussi is a law that allows employers in 
Italy to bring over foreign nationals who live abroad. However, while this is its official remit, 
the law was used quite differently in practice. The following extract from La Repubblica 
describes how the law often functioned: 
 
In reality, as all immigrants know well, for years the decreto flussi has been 
the only chance for migrants to escape illegality and access a permit (due to a 
lack of amnesties). The procedure however is not simple or without risks. First 
one submits the application and then one enters into the quota (and returns to 
one’s home country). Subsequently one then leaves his home country with a 
valid visa and finally re-enters Italy. Thus, exiting in a clandestine manner and 
re-entering in a regular one (my translation).
10
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As the extract outlines, the decreto flussi was typically used by ‘illegal’ migrants who were 
already on Italian territory. As one staff member commented, ‘who would hire somebody 
they did not know from abroad?’ If the application was successful, the migrant returned home 
and then re-entered Italy (this time legally) with a visa. Media coverage of the decreto flussi 
often referred to it as a beffa (hoax), highlighting how the law informally acted as a second 
amnesty for migrants on Italian territory without permits.  
 
In both the decreto flussi and amnesty, ‘employers’ were often friends, family or 
acquaintances who charged high rates to ‘employ’ a migrant. Given the dependency of 
permits on work and salary, it was easy for migrants in Italy to fall into ‘illegality’, meaning 
that opportunities to be re-regularized were in high demand. Rumours of decreto flussi and 
amnesties opening were rife throughout my fieldwork. In January 2011 a decreto flussi did 
finally open, but its practical use was somewhat different from previous years. One Saturday 
morning, Cara, a young woman from the Dominican Republic, was sitting at Alberto’s desk. 
The two were discussing the possible ways in which Cara’s sister might be able to enter Italy. 
Cara had Italian citizenship, so once on Italian territory her sister would be entitled to a permit 
on the grounds of family reunification. The problem, however, was how her sister would be 
able to enter. Aware that siblings of Italian citizens have the right to permits once on Italian 
territory, Italian embassies were reluctant to issue tourist visas to those in that category. One 
possible solution, Alberto suggested, was that Cara’s sister could apply for a Spanish tourist 
visa and then, taking advantage of the Schengen free travel accord, travel from Spain to Italy. 
Looking pensive and tapping the unlit cigarette in his hand, Alberto commented that Cara 
should consider the possibility that the long rumoured decreto flussi may actually open in the 
near future. He explained that if this happened, Cara could submit an application to ‘employ’ 
her sister as a domestic worker. If the application were successful Cara’s sister would be 
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issued with a visa and then once in Italy she could apply for a family permit as the sister of an 
Italian citizen. Cara looked unsure and responded that she would think about it. Her 
scepticism was justified. The decreto flussi works in a semi-arbitrary manner in which 
whoever submits the online application earlier has a greater chance of it being accepted. 
Furthermore, if the previous decreto flussi in 2007 was any indication, responses to 
applications could take up to two or three years.  
 
As the above example suggests, migrants made use of the 2011 decreto flussi in a different 
way to how they had done so in previous years. Rather than the law being used as a kind of 
general amnesty as it had been in the past, in 2011 it operated as a means of reunifying 
families. The previous 2007 decreto flussi had been massively over-subscribed, but because 
the 2011 procedure was taking place less than two years after the 2009 amnesty, the number 
of applicants for this decreto flussi was considerably reduced.
11
 As one staff member 
described to me, ‘many of those without permits who could be legalized [i.e. had kinship or 
financial capital] had already applied in the 2009 amnesty.’ Reflecting this, the 2011 decreto 
flussi was used instead as a type of family re-unification for relatives who otherwise were not 
permitted to migrate to Italy. While I was completing application forms for clients in the 
centre, the conversation would inevitably turn to which relative they were bringing over. 
People described to me how they hoped to help a sibling, nephew, niece or cousin. In the 
hundred or so applications that I completed, I did not come across a single genuine 
employer/employee relationship.  
 
As such, both the decreto flussi and amnesty offered valuable opportunities for migrants to 
become legalized, re-legalized or bring over a relative. What is key to the above discussion is 
that official terms and conditions were perceived as flexible by both staff and migrants. The 
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fact that the 2009 amnesty was intended exclusively for domestic workers was not conceived 
as restrictive; if one paid the right fees and completed the correct paperwork, it was 
immaterial whether the domestic work contract actually existed or not. Similarly, it was not 
an issue that the decreto flussi was designed for people outside of Italy – one would simply 
exit the country and then return.  
 
As the article from La Repubblica suggests, the existence of these tactics was no secret. 
Although form-filling was manipulated, people’s practical circumstances were not reshaped. 
Migrants felt no need to hide the details of their situation and state officials were not 
interested in the circumstances providing the paperwork was in order. In the aftermath of the 
2009 amnesty, Mirkena, who had previously volunteered at the centre, was employed on a 
temporary basis at the Prefettura – the prefecture which deals with some immigration 
paperwork.
 
Amnesty applicants (both ‘employers’ and ‘employees’) were required to present 
themselves at the Prefettura to check that their declaration of income, housing situation and 
documents were all in order before passing the paperwork onto the Questura, who would 
eventually issue the permit. Shadowing Mirkena one morning at the Prefettura while she 
made her way through the day’s appointments, it became clear to me that the applicants were 
not afraid they might be found out or turned away if their ‘work’ relationship was discovered 
to be false. Domestic work ‘employers’ and ‘employees’ often included siblings and cousins. 
What counted was that the paperwork was in order; applicants were only turned away if they 
had brought the wrong declaration of income, housing document or residence certificate.  
 
Contacts count 
Migrants’ diverse navigation of the documentation regime’s loopholes was, of course, 
contingent upon access to money and social networks. Perhaps even more valuable than 
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money were contacts in places that mattered. Samir approached the counter one morning to 
ask for advice on renewing his permit, which had already expired. He was fashionably 
dressed in a designer puffa-jacket, jeans and high-top trainers: his sense of style and fluent 
Italian language skills demonstrated that he had grown up in Italy. He took his permit out of 
his wallet, showing me that it had expired several months ago. It was an unemployment 
permit, a type of permit issued only once that lasts for just six months. Regardless of how 
long a person has been living and working legally in the country, if at the time of renewal 
they do not have a job, they lose the possibility for renewal, effectively becoming clandestino 
(‘illegal’). Furthermore, permits can be renewed only within two months of their expiry and 
Samir’s had expired five months previously. The reason he had not renewed his permit, he 
said, was because he had been unable to find a job. However, despite being technically 
‘illegal’ and holding an expired permit which was officially un-renewable, Samir appeared 
remarkably calm. Looking doubtful, my colleague at the counter advised him to make an 
appointment with the advice centre’s lawyer to see if there was any possibility of ‘saving’ 
Samir’s permit. The next day, however, Samir called into the centre to tell me that he had 
resolved his problem. He had a friend who worked at the Questura who told him that he 
would help him renew his permit. The permit would be for unemployment and would last two 
years, despite the fact that the law dictates that unemployment permits are non-renewable 
without a work contract and have a maximum duration of six months. Samir was told to fill 
out the application form as normal and to deposit it at the Questura.  
 
These cases show that access to particular resources – namely money, family or contacts – 
was essential in order to take advantage of the flexibility in the system and effectively exploit 
its loopholes. Overall, therefore, while migrants often cited the immigration bureaucracy as 
the most negative aspect of life in Italy, with the right skills and resources individuals were 
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able to take advantage of opportunities that would not be available in a more rigid and 
transparent system. They did this, for example, by bringing non-immediate family to Italy, 
taking advantage of contacts to change official rules or managing to obtain access to Europe 
without the correct requisites. Accessing contacts, paying for paperwork in the informal 
economy or learning to accept and make the most of the changing and flexible laws, were 
referred to by staff members and long-term migrants as pertaining to ‘il sistema paese’ 
[system of the country]. Given the complex nature of the bureaucratic regime, learning to 
manoeuvre around the system in this way was a sign of an integrated and long-term migrant. 
The attitudes and behaviours associated with the navigation of the bureaucracy, therefore, 
were seen to be culturally ‘Italian’, and those who successfully practised il sistema paese 
possessed insider knowledge. However, while insider knowledge was required in order to be 
successful, the following case shows how playing by il sistema paese rules could also lead to 
migrants ultimately losing out, as the precarious nature of their ‘legality’ trumped their insider 
cultural knowledge.  
 
 
Limits to Rule Bending 
 
Rashid was a man from Pakistan who frequently waited in the centre for hours on end hoping 
eventually to speak with Alberto. Alberto explained that the reason Rashid came to the centre 
so often was because he had still not received any response regarding his citizenship 
application, which he had submitted several years ago. Through visits to the Prefettura
 
and the 
Questura on Rashid’s behalf, Alberto discovered why his application had been ‘blocked’. 
Background checks are carried out on citizenship applicants to ensure that the applicant has 
no criminal offences and has paid taxes, fines and so on. While conducting the ‘controls’ on 
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Rashid’s background, the Questura discovered that his children had not been going to school. 
Rashid’s children were born in Italy, but when they were still very young they accompanied 
their mother when she left to live in Pakistan. I asked Alberto whether it would be helpful for 
Rashid to send the school certificates from Pakistan. Alberto shook his head and explained 
that migrants who are legally resident in Italy are not allowed permanently to live in another 
country. More seriously, because on paper his wife and children were living in Italy, Rashid 
had been receiving family benefits. If Rashid were to argue that his children were in Italy, he 
would be committing an offence by not sending them to school. If, on the other hand, he 
proved they had been living in Pakistan, he risked being accused of benefit fraud. Alberto 
advised Rashid to renounce his application and hope that nobody followed up on either issue: 
in this instance, there was no way round the bureaucracy. This case demonstrates that, in 
order successfully to be conceded citizenship, migrants need to have effectively managed the 
bureaucracy over many years. Key to Rashid’s failure was his lack of knowledge about the 
limits to the system’s flexibility. Successful migrants need to know where there are no 
loopholes. Inadequate knowledge of these limits can mean the risk of losing out on more than 
they might have gained. Thus, while strategies of navigation are useful in obtaining and 
renewing permits, they have limited use in accessing more secure legal statuses.  
 
Strategies of navigation, therefore, enable migrants to achieve basic goals, such as renewing a 
permit, bringing a parent to Italy or obtaining a fake work contract. However, migrants’ 
experiences, notwithstanding legal status or how long one had spent in the country, remain 
characterized by precarity and temporariness. The experiences of those such as Samir 
exemplify the disjuncture between the characteristics and insider knowledge required to 
successfully navigate the bureaucracy and the ultimate insecurity which migrants inhabit. 
While Samir possessed sufficient social capital to engage with Questura officials in order to 
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manipulate laws, ultimately he was risking being an ‘illegal’ migrant. In fact at the time of his 
visit to the centre technically he was ‘illegal’. As such, while the manipulative and sometimes 
subversive nature of migrants’ navigations of immigration law emphasize their agency and 
resourcefulness, the limits of such navigation remind us of the serious constraints that 
migrants face. Furthermore, and a point which will be developed in the conclusion, I suggest 
that because migrants’ tactical navigation enables them ‘to get by’, the institutionalization of 
illegality, precarity and exclusion within the immigration law remains unchallenged.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article I have explored the uncertain and shifting terrain which migrants must inhabit in 
their encounters with Italian immigration law. Due to long waiting times, the apparent 
changeability of regulations and the demands of the law itself, such encounters were frequent 
and enduring. By analysing migrants’ practices of manipulation and their ability to make the 
best of the law’s flexibility, I have suggested that experiences with the documentation regime 
necessitate the development of insider attitudes and behaviours. Learning these insider rules, 
however, exists in a complex relationship with the broader political, economic and legal 
structures that guide the bureaucracy. The same processes which produce migrants as cultural 
insiders also, paradoxically, structurally exclude them. 
 
As shown above, it is essential for migrants to strategically navigate the documentation 
regime in order to have applications accepted. The ‘illegal’ or ‘semi-legal’ nature of these 
strategies, however, should not lead to the assumption that they are challenges to the 
immigration bureaucracy. The over-riding frustration and desperation that most felt in relation 
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to their interaction with the documentation regime suggests that this was not the case. 
Building on work which has challenged the divide between ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ 
practices, I suggest that rather than considering migrants’ ‘misuse’ of the domestic worker 
amnesty and decreto flussi as separate from, or subversive of, official state practices, these 
strategies must be viewed as taking place within the same domain as the ‘official’ (Elyachar 
2005; Heyman & Smart 1999). Taking such an analytical stance reveals the way in which 
migrants’ informal strategies enable the Italian state to produce itself as a coherent entity. 
Specifically, migrants’ strategies allow the Italian state to obscure its own production of 
‘illegality’, while simultaneously satisfying its economic need for migrant labour. Firstly, 
migrants’ tacit and unofficial use of both the amnesty and the decreto flussi enable the Italian 
state to cover up the large number of ‘illegal’ migrants dwelling in the country’s frontiers, 
who would be considered undesirable by significant portions of the public and trouble other 
EU member-countries concerned about border security, particularly in the light of the Frontex 
agreements between states. Secondly, migrants’ use of the regularization procedures mask the 
fact that the country’s immigration law increases the number of ‘illegal’ migrants on Italian 
territory (Calavita 2005: 43). It was not only recently arrived ‘illegal’ migrants who took 
advantage of regularization policies. They were also used by those who had lived in Italy for 
years, or who were born in the country, but had fallen into ‘illegality’ usually through 
unemployment. Such unofficial regularization of ‘illegal’ migrants, therefore, covers up the 
way in which immigration law itself produces ‘illegal’ immigration, in some cases even 
causing members of the second generation to become ‘illegal’.  
 
I am not suggesting that the Italian state has a unified and intentional project to generate 
opaque laws that it hopes migrants will exploit in order to serve its own interests. As 
established in recent anthropological literature, the state is not a single, unified entity but ‘a 
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dispersed ensemble of institutional practices and techniques of governance’ (Hansen & 
Stepputat 2001: 14) composed of heterogeneous elements and representing diverse interests. 
Migrants’ creative use of the 2011 decreto flussi to bring over family members otherwise not 
permitted by law clearly demonstrates that the unofficial use of laws is accidental and 
multifaceted. What I claim, however, is that it is precisely through its multifarious nature that 
the state balances conflicting interests and aims. By engaging in ‘unofficial’ and ‘illegal’ 
practices, migrants’ strategies enable the Italian state to reconcile its contradictions and 
reproduce itself as a coherent whole. A state’s indeterminacies, therefore, can be productive. 
It is the people on the ground – advisers, low-level bureaucrats and, most importantly, 
migrants themselves – who must manage the messy uncertainties and contradictions that are 
inevitably also created. One of the central contradictions produced is that strategic 
engagement with bureaucratic systems can produce migrants as cultural insiders. Yet it is also 
through these very strategies that migrants’ structural exclusion is reinforced because the 
state’s production of ‘illegality’ and insecurity remains ultimately unchallenged. Given this, 
we must consider how the insecurity generated through state practices can manifest itself in 
multiple ways and obscure the origins of the insecurity itself.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 The number of migrants who naturalize as Italian citizens is low compared to other European countries 
(Bianchi 2011: 324). Those born in Italy have the possibility to apply for citizenship within one year of their 
eighteenth birthday but legal and bureaucratic obstacles lead to many losing this opportunity. 
2
 To protect my informants’ anonymity, the name of the city is not disclosed. 
3
 Questura is the singular and questure the plural.  
4
 Badante is the singular, badanti is the plural. 
5
 Caritas is a Catholic charity and major player for migrant politics and welfare in Italy.  
6
 All informants’ names, with the exception of public figures, have been changed.  
7
 These cohorts of people did not fit the gender or nationality stereotypes of an appropriate domestic worker.   
8
 La Repubblica 4th March 2010 
http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2010/03/04/news/l_ultima_beffa_agli_immigrati_spunta_la_sanatoria_trappola
-2499728/ Accessed 12
th
 November 2014 
9
 Article 14 of the Bossi Fini law. 
10
 La Repubblica 5th August 2008 http://www.repubblica.it/2008/08/sezioni/politica/immigrazione-
flussi/immigrazione-flussi/immigrazione-flussi.html Accessed 12th November 2014 
11
 The 2011 decreto flussi was also over-subscribed with more than 411,000 applicants for 98,080 places. 
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